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The court recognized that to promote the goal of section 1384, which is to
encourage employers to sell companies who contribute to the plan rather
than shut them down, all of a company's contribution history should shift
away from the seller upon a sale of assets, so Borden should not be
burdened with withdrawal liability a year after Drake's sale. However, the
court determined that Congress did not necessarily intend to burden the
purchaser with the full cost of this shift. Instead, the court suggested that
responsibility for the liability from the first five years of the ten year period
should shift, pro rata, to all other employers in the plan. Because this
interpretation serves the twin goals of protecting plan stability through sales
of assets instead of closings, while also assigning liability for all unfunded
benefits to active plan members based on their participation, the Borden
court reversed the decision of the District Court on this issue.
R.

SECURITIES REGULATION

Sandberg v. Virginia Bankshares, Inc.
979 F.2d 332 (4th Cir. 1992)
The doctrine of issue preclusion forecloses the relitigation of issues of
fact that are identical to issues determined and necessarily decided in prior
litigation.6 14 However, the party against whom issue preclusion is sought
must have had a full opportunity to litigate the issue in the preceding
case.6 15 Generally, a litigant can obtain preclusionary effect only through a
final, valid judgment.6 16 In addition, courts usually apply issue preclusion
617
only when no unfairness will result to the party opposing preclusion.
Another important litigation doctrine is the attorney-client privilege.
The attorney-client privilege usually prohibits the full discovery of communications made in confidence between attorneys and their clients.618 In
this manner, the privilege encourages frank discussions between attorneys
and clients. 61 9 However, this principle is not an absolute privilege. It is
subject to the qualification that any injury to the attorney-client relationship
by disclosure must be greater than the benefit gained toward the just disposal

.614. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n v. Baliles, 830 F.2d 1308, 1311 (4th Cir. 1987).
615. Id.
616. See 18 CtARus A. WiuGoH ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4432, at
298 (1981) (discussing traditional requirement that judgments be final to have preclusive effect).
617. See Swentek v. USAir, Inc., 830 F.2d 552, 561 (4th Cir. 1987) (stating that collateral
estoppel is appropriate where identical issue was litigated, issue was necessarily determined by
court of competent jurisdiction, and preclusion does not work unfairness in second trial); see
also Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 332-33 (1979) (holding that corporation had
full opportunity to litigate claims in prior action and that use of collateral estoppel did not
violate Seventh Amendment right to jury trial).
618. See 8 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EViDENCE IN TRUAtS AT ComMON LAW § 2292, at 554
(McNaughton rev. 1961) (discussing general principle of attorney-client privilege).
619. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
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of the litigation. 620 Moreover, courts confine the privilege to its narrowest
possible limits because it impedes complete discovery 6of2 the truth and
derogates litigants' rights to present all relevant evidence. '
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit contemplated
the doctrines of issue preclusion and attorney-client privilege in Sandberg
v. Virginia Bankshares,Inc.62 The facts and procedural history of Sandberg
are complex. First American Bankshares, Inc. (FABI), a holding company,
sought to consolidate its operations by merging the First American Bank,
Inc. (Bank) with Virginia Bankshares, Inc. (VBI). VBI owned eighty-five
percent of the Bank's stock. Minority shareholders possessed the remaining
fifteen percent of the Bank's stock. An investment banking firm, hired by
FABI, recommended forty-two dollars per share as the price the Bank
should offer its minority shareholders for their stock. The Bank did not
obtain an independent evaluation of the stock on behalf of the minority
shareholders. At the annual shareholders' meeting, the directors of the Bank
urged adoption of the merger proposal at the recommended price, asserting
that it was in the best interest of the minority stockholders because the
price offered for the stock was thirty percent higher than the price at which
the stock then traded. Doris I. Sandberg, a minority shareholder, withheld
the requested proxy, and after the shareholders had approved the merger,
she filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia against both VBI and FABI (referred to collectively as "Bankshares") and the directors of the Bank.
Sandberg's first claim alleged that defendants had solicited proxies in
violation of section 14(a) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934613 and
Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 14a-96u due to the proxy statement's false and misleading statements of fact. Sandberg's second claim
maintained that the defendants had breached fiduciary duties owed to the
minority shareholders under Virginia law. 6 5 At trial, the jury found that
all of the defendants had violated section 14(a) and Rule 14a-9 but that
only the directors of the Bank had breached their fiduciary duties. Accordingly, the jury found that Sandberg was entitled to eighteen dollars per
share above the price authorized at the shareholders' meeting and awarded
her $43,956.

620. See Wicaom, supra note 618, § 2285, at 527 (discussing conditions necessary for
establishment of privilege against disclosure of communications).
621. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 727 F.2d 1352, 1355 (4th Cir. 1984).
622. 979 F.2d 332 (4th Cir. 1992).
623. Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 § 14(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1988) (prohibiting
solicitation of proxies in manner inconsistent with SEC regulations).
624. 17 C.F.R. 240.14a-9 (1992) (prohibiting solicitation by means of proxy statement
containing false or misleading statement of material fact).
625. See Mardel Sec., Inc. v. Alexandria Gazette Corp., 320 F.2d 890, 894 (4th Cir. 1963)
(holding that majority shareholders owe fiduciary duty to minority shareholders under Virginia
law); Adelman v. Conotti Corp., 213 S.E.2d 774, 779 (Va. 1975) (holding that directors of bank
owe fiduciary duty to shareholders).
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While Sandberg's case was pending trial, Weinstein and other minority
shareholders filed a separate action against Bankshares in the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia pursuant to the same Securities
and Exchange law and Virginia breach of fiduciary duty arguments invoked
by Sandberg. The court transferred the case to the District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia. Following the Sandberg judgment, the District
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia applied issue preclusion and
granted the Weinstein plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment on both
the federal securities law and the state fiduciary duties claims. Defendants
appealed both judgments to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit, which affirmed the district court judgments. 62 The defendants then appealed to the United States Supreme Court, and the Supreme
Court granted certiorari. In the Supreme Court, the defendants first argued
that they were not liable under section 14(a) and Rule 14a-9 because the
misrepresentations in the proxy statements were only statements of opinion.
Secondly, the defendants asserted that plaintiffs had not proven causation
because the Bank controlled sufficient stock to authorize merger without
the approval of any minority stockholders. The Supreme Court reversed the
judgment for the plaintiffs, holding the plaintiffs had failed to show
causation, but the Court rejected the defendants' first argument, holding
627
that knowingly false statements in the form of opinions are actionable.
In addition, the Supreme Court expressly upheld the jury's conclusion that
the directors had violated Rule 14a-9. 628 Thus, the issue could have the
benefit on remand of full consideration at the trial and appellate levels. 629
On remand from the Supreme Court, the Fourth Circuit denied the plaintiffs' motion to affirm the alternative judgment for breach of fiduciary duty
and instead sent the case to the district court to consider the effects of the
Supreme Court's holding upon the alternative judgments.
The district court certified a class of minority shareholders that were
entitled to vote on the merger. The court vacated both the Sandberg and
Weinstein judgments and entered a claim for breach of fiduciary duty on
behalf of the named class. Furthermore, the district court applied a cap to
plaintiffs' recovery on the fiduciary duty claim pursuant to a Virginia statute
limiting the liability of corporate directors. 6 0 However, this statute contains
an exception if the corporate officers engaged in willful misconduct or a
knowing violation of any federal or state securities law. 631 The plaintiffs
argued that the cap was inapplicable because the jury's finding that the
directors violated Rule 14a-9 precluded argument over whether the director's

626. Sandberg v. Virginia Bankshares, Inc., 891 F.2d 1112, 1116 (4th Cir. 1989), cert.
granted in part, 495 U.S. 903 (1990).
627. Sandberg v. Virginia Bankshares, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2749, 2755, 2761 (1991).
628. 111 S. Ct. at 2757-61.
629. Id.
630. See VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-692.1 (Michie 1989) (placing limit on corporate officers'
liability in proceedings brought on behalf of shareholders of corporation).
631. Id.§ 13.1-62.1(B).
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knowingly violated federal securities law. The district court rejected this
argument. The court also denied plaintiffs' motion for a new trial against
Bankshares, choosing not to accept plaintiffs' argument that the district
court had erred in denying a motion to compel discovery on the grounds
of attorney-client privilege. The plaintiffs appealed.
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit dealt with the principles of issue preclusion and attorney-client privilege. The appellate court vacated the district
court's judgment and remanded the case once again. The Fourth Circuit
first applied issue preclusion and held that the jury implicitly had concluded
that the liability cap did not apply to Sandberg. Next, the appellate court
reversed the trial court's denial of a new trial on grounds that the trial
court improperly excluded discovery concerning a meeting between the
defendants, finding the evidence at issue was not privileged.
The Fourth Circuit began its analysis by addressing the plaintiffs' issue
preclusion argument concerning the application of the liability cap. The
appellate court decided that the Weinstein plaintiffs had waived their right
to challenge the cap because they could have anticipated recovery exceeding
the statutory limit and failed to challenge the cap at trial. However, the
Fourth Circuit found that the cap was not at issue in Sandberg's trial
because the district court had denied class certification making Sandberg's
maximum recovery well below the statutory limit. After the Fourth Circuit
reversed the district court on the class certification issue and after the
Supreme Court reversed on the federal securities claims, the cap became
relevant to the Sandberg plaintiffs. Therefore, the court found that the
Sandberg plaintiffs had raised their argument concerning the cap in a timely
fashion.
The Fourth Circuit considered the plaintiffs' argument that the appellate
court should construe the original jury verdict as a finding that the directors
knowingly violated Rule 14a-9. The statute placing a cap on directors'
liability is inapplicable if the directors have engaged in willful misconduct
or a knowing violation of federal or state security law. 632 The Fourth Circuit
explained that for the plaintiffs to convince the court to apply the jury's
factual finding of a violation of Rule 14a-9 to the separate question of
whether the Virginia cap was applicable, they must satisfy the four requirements of issue preclusion: (1) that the issue is identical to the one previously
litigated; (2) that the issue was actually determined in the litigation; (3) that
the issue was necessarily decided in the case; and (4) that the prior judgment
was final and valid. The court concluded that these factors involved mixed
questions of law and fact and should be reviewed de novo. However, the
court noted that an appellate court ordinarily should review the fairness of
the application of issue preclusion under an abuse of discretion standard.
Nevertheless, the Fourth Circuit retained the discretion to determine fairness,
without the district court having considered the issue, because the Fourth

632. Id.

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50:243

Circuit felt the proper resolution of the fairness question was clear beyond
any doubt.
Next, the Fourth Circuit examined whether the issues were identical to
one another. The court considered whether the jury's finding that the
directors acted in conscious disregard of misrepresentations in the proxy
statement satisfied the requirement in the Virginia statute that the directors
knowingly violated federal securities law. The Fourth Circuit determined
that the knowing component of the exception to the liability cap was
analogous to the scienter component of an intentional misrepresentation.
Accordingly, the court decided the jury's finding was comparable to the
knowing requirement of the statute because both knowledge that a statement
is true and conscious disregard of whether a statement is true satisfy the
scienter element of common law deceit. Thus, the Fourth Circuit found
that the issues were identical for the purpose of issue preclusion.
The Fourth Circuit then considered whether the issue was actually
determined in the previous litigation. The court found that the jury verdict,
in light of the jury instructions, indicated that the directors had consciously
disregarded whether the proxy statement contained misrepresentations. Rule
14a-9 prohibits solicitation by means of a proxy statement containing false
or misleading statements of material facts. The court stated that an action
brought pursuant to Rule 14a-9 is analogous to a common law action for
deceit because both concern a party making misrepresentations to another
party. The Fourth Circuit concluded that to find the directors liable under
Rule 14a-9, the jury had to decide that the proxy statement contained
material misrepresentations. The existence of such misrepresentations demonstrated that each individual director had asserted a fact as to his own
knowledge in the proxy statement when no director actually knew whether
the fact was true. The court felt this determination was equivalent to a
finding of conscious disregard, the scienter requirement for common law
deceit. Consequently, in recognizing a Rule 14a-9 violation, the jury implicitly found that the directors had acted knowingly and in conscious
disregard of whether or not the proxy statement contained misrepresentations.
Furthermore, the Fourth Circuit decided that the jury's determination
that the proxy statement contained material misrepresentations was necessary
to the judgment. All of the factual theories that the district court described
to the jury as comprising a Rule 14a-9 violation involved the directors'
conscious disregard of the truthfulness of the proxy statement. The Fourth
Circuit also concluded that the judgment was final and valid. The court
interpreted the finality requirement as ensuring that the parties are not
denied appellate review. Because the Fourth Circuit and the Supreme Court
had considered and upheld the jury's conclusion that the directors had
violated Rule 14a-9, the court found this requirement satisfied.
The Fourth Circuit also considered the fairness of the application of
issue preclusion. The directors of the Bank argued that they did not have
a full opportunity to litigate whether they had acted knowingly. The court
concluded that the presentation of more evidence would not provide the
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directors with a fairer opportunity to litigate the issue. A key issue at trial
was whether the directors had a basis for making the representations in the
proxy statement. To help the directors' argument, any additional evidence
as to whether they had acted knowingly would have to indicate that the
directors did not know they lacked a sufficient basis for making the
representations in the proxy statement. However, such a showing would
demonstrate the directors were ignorant of their own responsibilities. The
Bank directors had struggled at trial to prove their competence, and the
Fourth Circuit found it unlikely that they would have offered evidence of
their incompetence under those circumstances. Consequently, the court
found that the directors' inability to present additional evidence on the
"knowing" issue worked no prejudice. Therefore, the Fourth Circuit construed the jury verdict, which found the Bank's directors guilty of violating
Rule 14a-9, as rendering Virginia's statutory limitation on the directors'
liability inapplicable by virtue of issue preclusion.
The Fourth Circuit then addressed the plaintiffs' contention that the
district court had erred in applying attorney-client privilege to deny plaintiffs' motion to compel the production of evidence regarding a meeting
between representatives of the Bank and Bankshares on April 20, 1987. The
Chairman and Executive Vice-President of the Bank, the Bank's general
counsel, two attorneys for VBI, and lawyers for FABI attended the meeting.
The gathering occurred one day before the shareholders' meeting at which
the shareholders were to vote on the merger. The Fourth Circuit determined
that it should review the application of the attorney-client privilege de novo
because the issue presented a mixed question of law and fact. The plaintiffs
argued that the purpose of the meeting was business, not legal advice or
strategy and that the communications were not confidential because third
parties were present. Although the court assumed for the purposes of appeal
that the participants discussed legal advice and strategy at the meeting, the
court found that the Bank could not assert the privilege against its shareholders because the plaintiffs had shown good cause why they should have
access to the communications.
The Fourth Circuit explained that a corporation's assertion of the
attorney-client privilege complicates analysis of the doctrine, especially when
shareholders are seeking the protected information. Because the shareholders
are the persons for whose benefit the directors of the corporation are acting,
the court concluded it must balance the management's need to manage, and
its concomitant ability to seek legal counsel, with the interests of the
shareholders. Adopting the rule of a United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit decision concerning a similar class action brought by
shareholders of a corporation against the corporation's officers and directors, 633 the court held that under such circumstances shareholders may show

633. Garner v. Wolfimbarger, 430 F.2d 1093, 1103-04 (5th Cir. 1970) (holding that minority
stockholders are not automatically entitled to discovery of all corporate secrets, but where
stockholders allege actions by directors inimicable to stockholders' interests, discovery is allowable
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"good cause" why the officers should not be permitted to invoke the
attorney-client privilege.
In making this "good cause" determination, the court considered a
number of factors to be important. The Fourth Circuit found that the
plaintiffs' good faith was not in doubt and that their claim was obviously
colorable, the plaintiffs having already prevailed at trial. Moreover, the
evidence sought was not available from other sources. The plaintiffs had
good reason to seek these communications, and trade secrets were not at
stake. In addition, the certified class held a substantial portion-fifteen
percent-of the stock of the corporation. The Fourth Circuit felt the facts
were inconclusive as to whether the communications were concerning the
litigation itself.
Finally, the court found that the communications in the April 20 meeting
were analogous to communications with an attorney for the purpose of
facilitating a fraud, which are not protected by the attorney-client privilege.
Under the fraud exception, the societal interests in preventing fraud outweigh
the interest of maintaining confidentiality between a client and his attorney.
Similarly, society's interest in enforcing fiduciary duties is greater under
certain circumstances than a corporation's interest in confidential communications with its attorneys. Therefore, the Fourth Circuit found the shareholders' interest in obtaining information relating to the April 20 meeting
outweighed the policy concerns supporting the attorney-client privilege. The
Fourth Circuit further concluded that the district court's error in applying
the attorney-client privilege was not harmless. Because the minority shareholders did not prevail on their breach of fiduciary duty claim against
Bankshares and the excluded evidence was directly relevant to this issue,
the Fourth Circuit ordered a new trial on the state law claim.
The Fourth Circuit's handling of both the issue preclusion question and
the applicability of the attorney-client privilege in Sandberg was proper and
fair. Although not obvious, the relationship between the jury's verdict that
the directors were guilty of violating Rule 14a-9 and a finding of a knowing
violation of federal securities law was strong enough for the court to apply
issue preclusion. It should not be necessary for a judgment to expressly
state a factual finding to have preclusive effect if a court clearly can
conclude that the factual determination was necessarily implicit in the
verdict. 614 Also, a court's full examination of the specific requirements of

under showing of "good cause"). The Fifth Circuit identified relevant factors in making a
determination as to whether "good cause" exists: (1) the number of stockholders and the
percentage of stock they possess; (2) the bona fides of the shareholders; (3) the nature of the
shareholders' claim; (4) the apparent necessity or desirability of the shareholders having the
information; (5) whether the shareholders' claim involves wrongful action by the corporation; (6)
whether the communication related to past or to prospective litigation; (7) whether the communication is of advice concerning the litigation itself; (8) the extent to which the shareholders are
blindly fishing for information; and (9) the risk of revelation of trade secrets. Id. at 1104.
634. See Myrha v. Park, 258 N.W. 515, 518 (Minn. 1935) (finding that issue preclusion is
applicable if any of possible grounds for prior verdict determined question at issue).
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issue preclusion should ensure that the doctrine is fairly applied. Similarly,
the Fourth Circuit correctly balanced the interests of both the directors of
the corporation and the minority shareholders in deciding whether the
corporate officers could-utilize the attorney client-privilege. When shareholders allege that directors acted inimically to the shareholders' interests,
that the shareholders have a good basis for desiring the information, that
the information cannot be obtained from any other source, and that the
information bears directly on an important issue in the case, a court should
not deprive minority shareholders of discovery. 6 5 However, requiring proof
of "good cause" from minority shareholders provides for derogation of the
attorney-client privilege only when shareholders can show that such derogation is absolutely necessary.
Fortson v. Winstead, McGuire, Sechrest & Minick
961 F.2d 469 (4th Cir. 1992)
In order to prove a claim of securities fraud under section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934636 (1934 Act) based on a failure to disclose
material information, a plaintiff must first prove that the defendant was
under a duty to disclose that information to the plaintiff. 637 However,
federal securities laws, in and of themselves, do not set forth a basis upon
which a duty to disclose can be established.
In Fortson v. Winstead, McGuire, Sechrest & Minick65 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit examined the relationship
between the plaintiffs and defendant to determine if the defendant owed
the plaintiffs a duty to disclose. The court refused to find that the defendant
law firm, which the general partners of a limited partnership had retained
to prepare a tax opinion for the offering memorandum, owed a duty to
the limited partners to disclose certain material facts in the offering memorandum. Additionally, the court denied the plaintiffs' plea to create such
a duty based on sound public policy.
The Fortson plaintiffs, limited partners in City Centre Partnership, a
real estate partnership, alleged that the offering memorandum for the
partnership failed to disclose certain material facts regarding the financial
condition of the general partners and the projected success of the partnership. The plaintiffs asserted their claims against the syndicator of the
offering, Craig Hall; the general partners and other Hall affiliates; and the

635. See Garner v. Wolfirbarger, 430 F.2d 1093, 1103-04 (5th Cir. 1970) (stating factors
that will determine that "good cause" exists where minority shareholders asserted claim against

directors of corporation for taking actions inimicable to shareholders' interests); see supra note
633 (listing factors in "good cause" determination).

636. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)(1988).
637. See Dirks v. Securities & Exch. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 646, 657-58 (1983) (holding that

plaintiff must prove that defendant owes plaintiff duty to disclose) (citing Chiarella v. United
States, 445 U.S. 222, 231-32 n.14 (1980)).
638. 961 F.2d 469 (4th Cir. 1992).
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law firm of Winstead, McGuire, Sechrest & Minick (Winstead). Hall Financial Real Estate Group (HFG), which formed the limited partnership,
retained Winstead to render a tax opinion concerning certain tax aspects of
the City Centre Partnership. Although the plaintiffs did not challenge the
accuracy of the tax opinion, they contended that Winstead breached its
duty under federal securities laws and state common law by failing to
inquire into the financial disclosures of the partnership and ensuring the
completeness and accuracy of the disclosures. The United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia granted Winstead's motion for
summary judgment on all counts, holding that Winstead owed no duty to
the limited partners.
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's holding.
Applying Texas law, which was the governing law pursuant to the terms of
the partnership agreement and subscription documents, the court found that
Winstead owed no duty of disclosure to the limited partners. The plaintiffs
alleged that Winstead failed to ensure that the financial disclosures made
by Hall and HFG in the Private Placement Memorandum (PPM) were not
misleading and that Winstead was thus liable under Section 10(b) of the
1934 Act and under state common law for fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of fiduciary duty. However, in order for liability to attach
to the federal securities claim, plaintiffs had to establish the existence of a
duty of disclosure on the part of the law firm arising out of a fiduciary or
other relationship of trust. Federal securities laws, in and of themselves, do
not create a duty to disclose. Likewise, in order to prove the state law
claims, which were governed by the laws of Texas, plaintiffs had to show
the existence of a similar duty.
Plaintiffs asserted three arguments to establish the existence of Winstead's duty to disclose: first, Winstead owed the limited partners a duty
as the intended third-party beneficiaries of the legal services rendered for
the general partners; second, American Bar Association Ethics Opinion 346
(ABA Ethics Opinion) 639 and a certain Treasury Department regulation64

established Winstead's duty to disclose; and third, absent a legal basis for
Winstead's duty of disclosure, public policy demanded that the court find
the existence of a duty.
The PPM identified Winstead as counsel for the partnership and explained that Winstead was writing the tax opinion for the benefit of the
partnership and the partners. Based on this language and the fact that
Winstead had drafted disclosure letters to investors in other HFG partnerships, plaintiffs argued that Winstead had knowledge that the limited
partners would rely on the offering documents and would therefore be
entitled to sue as the foreseeable and intended third-party beneficiaries of
Winstead's tax opinion.

639. ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 346
(1982).
640. Tax Shelter Opinions, 31 C.F.R. § 10.33(a)(1)(ii)(1992).
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The Fourth Circuit rejected this argument for two reasons. First, the
court questioned the foreseeability of the limited partners' reliance. According to the Fourth Circuit, Winstead could have expected the plaintiffs to
rely on its tax opinion; however, it could not have expected that the limited
partners would rely on the law firm for financial disclosures by the general
partners, despite the firm's invQlvement in other HFG projects. In fact, the
firm specifically stated in its opinion letter that it had relied upon Arthur
Anderson's financial projections and had not verified them nor expressed
an opinion concerning their validity. Based on these disclaimers, the court
refused to assume Winstead's knowledge of a foreseeable reliance. Second,
the court explained that even if Winstead could have foreseen that the
limited partners would rely on the law firm for financial disclosures, Texas
law does not recognize a duty to disclose material information to intended
third-party beneficiaries unless they are in privity with the defendant.
Plaintiffs further contended that Winstead's duty of disclosure was
based on the language of a Treasury Department regulation regarding tax
shelter opinions and an ABA Ethics Opinion. Plaintiffs believed that Winstead's reliance on the partnership's representations, absent independent
verification, was at odds with both standards. The court noted that although
language in both the ABA opinion and the cited Treasury regulation
supported a number of positions not alleged in the case, Winstead's conduct
was not facially inconsistent with either standard. The standards state that
an attorney does not have the responsibility to audit his client's representations nor should he be required to assume that those representations are
unreliable unless he has a reasonable cause to believe that those representations are untrue." 1
Even had the Fourth Circuit determined that Winstead's activities were
inconsistent with the standards cited by the plaintiffs, the court was unwilling
to use these standards to establish a legal duty to disclose. According to
the court, the cited ABA Ethics Opinion was created to provide guidance
to attorneys and to regulate their conduct; it was not intended to create an
actionable duty in favor of third parties. The court further explained that
although treasury regulations do have the force of law, the noted regulation
was not applicable in the case sub judice because the regulation governs an
attorney's practice before the Internal Revenue Service and does not create
a third-party claim against an attorney. Thus, the court held the standards
could not establish a legal duty of disclosure or serve as the basis for a
securities fraud claim.
The Fourth Circuit summarily dismissed plaintiffs' final argument, that
Winstead's duty was grounded in sound public policy. The court found that

641. See Tax Shelter Opinions, 31 C.F.R. § 10.33(a)(1)(ii) (1992) (stating that attorney can
rely on asserted fact unless attorney has reason to believe that facts are untrue); ABA Comm.
on Professional Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 346 (1982) (stating that
attorney can depend on accuracy of client's statement as long as attorney has no knowledge that
would raise suspicion).
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imposing a duty on attorneys to monitor the representations that their clients
make to third parties would in effect make lawyers "designated watchdogs."
The court refused to find this implicit duty, especially given the express
disclaimer printed by Winstead in the PPM.
In requiring plaintiffs to establish the existence of a fiduciary or
confidential relationship in order to prove a duty to disclose, the Fourth
Circuit has joined other circuits that hold that federal securities laws do
not act as a source of such a duty." 2 Although plaintiffs attempted to
establish a duty to disclose through the use of a third-party beneficiary
argument, the Fourth Circuit correctly applied Texas law in requiring privity
before such a duty could be imposed." 3 Although a minority trend has
developed, including a decision by the Fourth Circuit,64 that does not
require a finding a privity, the Fourth Circuit was required in this case to
decide the issue based on Texas law.
Howard v. Haddad

962 F.2d 328 (4th Cir. 1992)
Section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act)
prohibits deceptive or manipulative sales of registered securities.6 5 To determine the relevant limitations period for filing claims under section 10(b),
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit previously utilized
the closest analogous state statute of limitations that addressed the relevant

interests and policy considerations. 6 However, in Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind,
Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson,"7 the United States Supreme Court established a uniform statute of limitations period for all claims under section
10(b) of the 1934 Act."8 In Gilbertson, the Supreme Court held that claims
alleging violation of section 10(b) of the 1934 Act must be filed within one

642. Schatz v. Rosenberg, 943 F.2d 485, 490-92 (4th Cir. 1991); Abell v. Potomac Ins. Co.,
858 F.2d 1104, 1124 (5th Cir. 1988), vacated on other grounds, 492 U.S. 914 (1989); Barker v.
Henderson, Franklin, Starnes & Holt, 797 F.2d 490, 495-96 (7th Cir. 1986).
643. See Dickey v. Jansen, 731 S.W.2d 581, 582-83 (Tex. Civ. App. 1987) (holding third
parties have no standing to sue attorney based on attorney's representation of others); First Mun.
Leasing Corp. v. Blankenship, Potts, Aikman, Hagin & Stewart, P.C., 648 S.W.2d 410, 413
(Tex. Civ. App. 1983) (stating absence of privity relieves attorney from any duty of discIoure,
even if attorney knows that third party will rely on attorney's opinion).
644. See Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Nat'l Bank v. Swartz, Bresenoff, Yavner & Jacobs, 455
F.2d 847, 851 (4th Cir. 1972) (imposing liability on accountant despite absence of privity);
Roberts v. Ball, Hunt, Hart, Brown and Baerwitz, 128 Cal. Rptr. 901, 905 (Ct. App. 1976)
(holding that privity is not required when attorney is acting with malicious motive). But see
Fickett v. Superior Court, 558 P.2d 988, 990 (Ariz. 1976) (holding that liability to third parties
not in privity is matter of policy and involves balancing of factors).
645. Securities & Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1988).
646. Gurley v. Documation, Inc., 674 F.2d 253, 257-58 (4th Cir. 1982).
647. 111 S. Ct. 2773 (1991).
648. Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 111 S. Ct. 2773, 2781-82
(1991).
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year after discovery of facts comprising the violation and within three years
after the violation. 649 On the same day, in James B. Beam Distilling Co. v.
Georgia,650 the Supreme Court decided that when it retroactively applies a
new civil rule to a case, it must also retroactively apply the rule to similar,
6
pending cases. 1'
In Howard v. Haddad,65 2 the Fourth Circuit considered whether the
plaintiff, Edward G. Howard, filed his claim within one year of discovering
the facts underlying an alleged violation of section 10(b) of the 1934 Act.
The Fourth Circuit also considered whether Beam compelled retroactive
application of the uniform one year limitations period established in Gilbertson. In addition, because violations of section 13.1-522(a) of the Virginia.
Securities Act, 653 like violations of section 10(b) of the 1934 Act, require a
showing of materiality, the Fourth Circuit examined whether the alleged
misrepresentations were material or mere puffery.
The plaintiff, Howard, first met the defendant, Said Haddad, while
travelling in 1967. Following this meeting, Howard and Haddad played golf
together a few times each year in Florida. Haddad was a director of Trust
Bank, a state-chartered bank in Florida. Howard alleged that while playing
golf in September 1986, Haddad induced him to purchase shares of Trust
Bank stock by misrepresenting and omitting material facts concerning the
bank's financial health. Haddad allegedly stated that Trust Bank was
"growing" and "doing well." Haddad also purportedly said that the stock
was "a good investment," "a good opportunity," and "would be difficult
to secure for Howard." In fact, Trust Bank had suffered substantial losses
every year since its inception in 1984, would incur a significant loss in 1986,
held poor quality assets, and was operating under a memorandum of
understanding with the Florida Department of Banking. In October 1986,
Howard purchased a total of 100,000 shares of Trust Bank stock for
$500,000. Three months after purchasing the shares, Howard joined Trust
Bank's board of directors. In October 1987, Howard became chairman of
Trust Bank and retained this position until the bank closed in January
1988.
After the failure of Trust Bank, Howard filed a two count complaint
against Haddad in the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Virginia based on alleged violations of the 1934 Act and the Virginia
Securities Act. The Federal Deposit Insurance Company filed for intervention and moved to dismiss the complaint. The district court granted both
motions. On appeal, the Fourth Circuit granted intervention, but reversed
the dismissal and remanded the case for further hearings. On remand, the
district court again granted dismissal of the complaint, finding that Howard

649.
650.
651.
652.
653.

Id. at 2781.
111 S. Ct. 2439 (1991).
James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 111 S. Ct. 2439, 2447-48 (1991).
962 F.2d 328 (4th Cir. 1992).
VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-522 (Michie 1992).
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failed to establish the alleged misrepresentations and any affirmative duty
for Haddad to disclose relevant financial information.
Howard appealed, arguing that issues of material fact precluded summary judgment. To resolve the issue, the Fourth Circuit first decided that
Beam mandated retroactive application of the statute of limitations period
established in Gilbertson for alleged section 10(b) violations of the 1934
Act. Next, the Fourth Circuit attempted to discover whether Howard filed
suit within one year of discovering the alleged violations of the 1934 Act.
The Fourth Circuit reasoned that the uniform one-year limitations period
began to run either at the time of discovery or when, by reasonable diligence,
Howard should have discovered the alleged violations.
Based on Howard's own testimony, the Fourth Circuit concluded that
Howard had notice of the facts constituting the alleged section 10(b)
violations at least fifteen months before he filed suit on September 28,
1988. Howard's testimony revealed that he had attended his first board
meeting in January 1987 and had discovered then that the bank was not a
sound investment. Likewise, Howard's deposition testimony revealed that
by May 1987 he had knowledge of the bank's prior losses, the bank's
precarious financial condition, and the existence of the Memorandum of
Understanding with the Florida Department of Banking. The Fourth Circuit
refused to remand the case for further factual findings because Howard
had prior opportunities to establish any issues of material fact and had
failed to do so. Thus, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's
dismissal of Howard's section 10(b) claim because, as a matter of law,
Howard had discovered the facts comprising the alleged section 10(b)
violation more than one year before commencement of the suit.
The Fourth Circuit next addressed Howard's claim that Haddad violated
section 13.1-522 of the Virginia Securities Act. Section 13.1-522(a) of the
Virginia Securities Act, like sectiQn 10(b) of the 1934 Act, requires a showing
that the alleged misrepresentations were material. The Fourth Circuit believed that Haddad's general statements were mere puffery and therefore
lacked the materiality essential to a securities fraud claim. In addition, the
Fourth Circuit reasoned that the atmosphere-a golf game between casual
acquaintances-undermined Howard's arguments that the misrepresentations
were material. The Fourth Circuit also concluded that Howard failed to
establish any basis for a fiduciary relationship between Haddad and Howard,
which would have imposed an affirmative duty upon Haddad to disclose
relevant financial information about Trust Bank. Thus, the Fourth Circuit
alternatively affirmed the district court's dismissal of Howard's claim under
the Virginia Securities Act.
The Fourth Circuit's decision in Howard, applying retroactively the
uniform period of limitations established in Gilbertson to claims alleging
section 10(b) violations, is in accord with a decision of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.6 5 4 Likewise, the Fourth Circuit's
654. See Boudreau v. Deloitte, Haskins, & Sells, 942 F.2d 497, 498 (8th Cir. 1991) (stating
that Beam forced retroactive application of Gilbertson holding).

